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1. Introduction
Two major developments are set to change defence and security landscapes in
the coming decade: the Lisbon treaty will affect in a significant way the Euro-
pean Union’s ‘external action’ and at Bucharest, NATO’s Heads of State & Gov-
ernment decided to overhaul Defence Planning to make it more integrated and
harmonised across all disciplines, which should in turn provide a blueprint for
leaner and more efficient structures. At least, that’s the plan. And it had better
be a good one, since defence planning for both organisations accounts for
approximately 780 billion dollar per annum, on average 2,8% of the GDP their
member states produce (i.e. 2/3 of the wealth produced across the globe).
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) – when implemented1 – will endow its re-baptised
Common Defence and Security Policy (ESDP in the actual EU treaty) with two
new instruments, the Enhanced Cooperation and the Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PermStrucCoop). By granting the Union a legal personality2 and
limited new decision opportunities, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy or a group of Member States that are ‘willing and have the
necessary capability’ for a special task should be able to take it on (at their own
expense, unless decided otherwise3). PermStrucCoop, second in the rearranged
EU-toolbox,  should tailor for longer term capability-building by a strongly
motivated ‘core’ that fulfils ‘higher criteria and which have made more binding
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding
missions’. Although Art 42§3 explicitly will incite all Member States to ‘under-
take progressively to improve their military capabilities’, it remains to be seen
whether governments and parliaments ratifying the ToL will put their money
where their mouth is.
PermStrucCoop is understood to be ‘inclusive’,4 even for those countries that
would consider spending 2% of their GDP for security and defence entirely out
of reach. But unless it is to be a “zero-growth-doing-more-with-less” exercise –
a distinct possibility in times of austere government spending and competing
budget priorities – a steady decline in national defence budgets will have to be
reversed to meet even the most modest admission standards. Arguably however,
1. The Treaty of Lisbon amends the existing EU-treaty which will be ‘consolidated’ once all ratifi-
cation instruments have been deposited. The referendum in Ireland will undoubtedly have an effect
on the intended date of 1 Jan 2009.
The consolidated version of the new EU-treaty will be used as reference and can be consulted on
the website of the EU-council at www.consilium.europa.eu. 
2. Art. 47 of the future consolidated EU-treaty. 
3. Art. 332 of the future consolidated EU-treaty. 
4. Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP (Egmont Paper 20).
Brussels, Egmont, 2008. BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
4
combining efficiency & efficacy with the magic trilogy of ‘specialisation – coop-
eration – pooling’ should bring PermStrucCoop within reach of most Member
States. Thus, a two-tier “defence community” – considered undesirable by some
for CSDP, unavoidable in NATO by others – would be averted.
This paper will explore how ‘theological’ criteria could be translated to key
performance indicators of a pragmatic and balanced scorecard for defence and
security efforts, both in the NATO and EU framework. Whether they are then
also used as discriminators towards PermStrucCoop is a matter of political
debate, but tailoring targets to the different profiles of possible contenders by
checking and balancing the scorecard indicators should provide a positive, yet
challenging roadmap for convergence. Concerning the other major challenge
brought to the fore by PermStrucCoop – generating forces and capabilities for
NATO or EU-led operations – it can be argued that current burden and risk-
sharing mechanisms (or the lack thereof) are to be reviewed and rethought: food
for those thoughts will be presented.
Patrick WOUTERS5
5. Patrick Wouters is a Colonel in the Belgian Air Force. The views expressed by the author are
strictly his own and do not necessarily coincide with the policy of Belgian Defence or any of the
organisations cited.5
2. How to Operationalize the 
Commitments of PermStrucCoop
In Egmont Paper 20, Biscop develops some lines of force, while further defining
the challenge: “to reconcile inclusiveness and commitment, to agree on criteria
that allow all Member States to participate, each at his own level of means, but
that do imply a substantial commitment to make available more usable capabil-
ities”.
Criteria judged unsuitable or unrealistic would be of general budgetary nature
(e.g. the previously mentioned 2% of GDP) and those specifically seeking a
sound balance between personnel costs, operational costs and investments.6
Usability criteria of 40% deployability and 8% sustainability ‘seem equally
laudable’ but have alledgedly not yielded substantial improvements.
If it is correct that these uni-dimensional figures in themselves are either unreal-
istic in the short term or fail to secure assured availability for operations, they
were intended as ‘simple’ parameters for Heads of State and Government to
approve and commit to when preparing national budget proposals. It is also true
that these unembellished political target figures validate – or invalidate – true
defence investments, that should yield usable capabilities, provided the budgets
can be appropriated along strictly military lines of effort, void of political inter-
ference. Furthermore, it is a matter of public knowledge that imbalances in per-
sonnel costs are in most cases the consequence of political constraints and inter-
ferences with base closure plans or restructurings of defence establishments.
Indeed, given the incompressibility of personnel costs, zero growth budgets (not
even compensating for inflation) inevitably result in cuts in operations, mainte-
nance and equipment.
Which criteria then would qualify to operationalize the commitments of
PermStrucCoop?
Before seeking answers to that question, it is helpful to highlight the guiding
principles of the intended PermStrucCoop. They can be found in the special
protocol on PermStrucCoop, which in its Article 2 entices Member States to
(author’s emphasis):
a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view
to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expendi-
6. A balance 50%-25%-25% is used in management theories for profit organisations, but is not
necessarily valid for non-profit organisations or defence matters: NATO has adopted 20% for
equipment expenditures as threshold figure.BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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ture on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light
of the security environment and of the Union’s international responsibilities;
b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible,
particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by
pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capa-
bilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;
c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibil-
ity and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common
objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing
their national decision-making procedures;
d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good,
including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to
undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the “Capability Development
Mechanism”;
e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European
equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.
Mutadis mutandis, several elements of this recipe could serve as guideline to
recent NATO initiatives aimed at re-invigorating defence planning, which will
endeavour to integrate logistics, C³, resource and – most importantly – arma-
ments planning with traditional force planning. This integration of force plan-
ning with other disciplines should avoid that shortfalls are being identified by
Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) and NATO, but subsequently do not necessarily
coincide with the priorities of National Armaments Directors (NAD). Given the
independent course that NADs are allowed to steer in some countries from their
CHODs and – as a matter of course, from their national industries– it is clear
that this will be the most difficult, but also the most rewarding harmonisation
effort of the NATO’s new Integrated Defence Planning Processes(IDPP). While
this independence is cherished by some, its influence on inadequacies between
weapon systems available (or coming in line) and military requirements of the
instant indicate the interest of integrating, if not merging the two processes.
Along the same lines, logistics, C³ and resource7 planning should be closely tied
to force planning.
In the case of the EU, embedding the very same processes in one agency by
entrusting the European Defence Agency (EDA) with counsel and support for
PermStrucCoop therefore, should also help overcome tacit barriers and align
7. ‘Resource planning’ in this context encompasses the NATO Structural Improvement Programme
(NSIP) and NATO owned assets (e.g. AWACS). BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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defence investment with capability-based planning.8 Not all member states are
likely to agree however about the level of ‘supra-national’ authority that should
be granted to the EDA.
In trying to derive concrete criteria for participation from the highlights of the
PermStrucCoop protocol, some key characteristics have been opined (with pre-
cious little practical detail, however) in different fora:
• they have to be quantifiable and verifiable;
• they should indicate precise qualitative objectives, aimed at the precise tar-
gets rather than at the total of their armed forces;
• they should present a reasonable challenge whilst tending toward a fair bur-
den-sharing;
• they should be result-oriented, seeking out which capabilities are necessary
and how to use them;
• they can be spread on a timetable (cfr. convergence criteria for the Eurozone),
as long as implementation is monitored.
If these ‘key performance indicators’ (KPI) do not seem controversial at first
glance,9 finding criteria that fulfil them and can be tailored to member states
with different profiles, while avoiding the appearance of manipulation, could
prove very difficult and divisive.
Ultimately though, more important than finding and agreeing on criteria, will
be to pursue innovative and pragmatic ways to align national with collective
security interests and funnel government spending more efficiently to support
them. This inherent tension between spending budgets as part of a multilateral
effort versus national projects and operations will be discussed further.
8. ‘Capability-based’ planning is replacing the ‘threat-based’ approach: nations are asked to pro-
vide ‘capability’, not necessarily platforms (ships/aircraft or vehicles). A tangible example is the
current shortfall of in-theatre airlift in Afghanistan: the capability can also be delivered with GPS-
aided precisions airdrop systems instead of (expensive) helicopters.
9. When identifying KPIs, management theory often uses the acronym SMART: Specific– Measura-
ble– Achievable  – Result-oriented or Relevant – Time-bound. 9
3. Building a Defence Key Performance 
Indicator List
Three ‘strategic objectives’ tied to broad categories of criteria seem to be part of
any sensible approach:
• building military capabilities
• ensuring operational commitment
• governing defence investment
Attempting to measure both efficiency & effectiveness10 – while aggregating
quantifiable and verifiable
parameters expressed in different (often incomparable) units of measure – is
bound to be controversial and will prove difficult to reach consensus upon. Fur-
thermore, taking any of these parameters in isolation and suggesting a member
state would need to make good on it, would be construed as ‘biased and uni-
focal’: the usability debate in NATO is challenging this very approach, since
some nations question the need to spend their scarce budgets on making troops
‘deployable’ and/or ‘sustainable’ in the face of primary needs they consider more
immediate and crucial for their security (e.g. Turkey in relation to what it qual-
ifies as terrorism requiring troops to deploy within or just beyond its borders).
Others, unsurprisingly with the USA in the lead, believe that transformed mili-
tary forces can only be deployable and consider ‘homeland’ (i.e. non-deploya-
ble) defence as non-military. These differences in (historic) perspective obviously
complicate agreement on which yardstick to measure performance with. The
influence of these different perspectives can be mitigated by considering several
indicators and scaling them to the size of a country’s economy by using an ade-
quate denominator. This denominator can be ‘per capita’ or ‘as % of active
population’, thus expressing effort and efficiency of a defence establishment or
government. It can also focus more on a desired effect, c.q. ‘per military’ or ‘as
% of land strength’, thus expressing the efficacy of either organisation. The
table below presents a tentative list of indicators, that can be expanded at will
(given consensus) and weighted, if deemed necessary.
10. Defined respectively as ‘the ratio of the effective or useful output to the total input in any sys-
tem’ and ‘capacity or power to produce a desired effect’. Efficacy will further be used as synonym
for effectiveness.BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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As mentioned, trying to aggregate these parameters in different frameworks
(EU, NATO etc.) without skewing the results is the next problem: this can be
addressed by ‘ranking’ member states for each indicator in one of the three cat-
egories through calculating its percentile11 value. By way of example, the pro-
posed method provides thresholds for each indicator at a certain moment (e.g.
the intended implementation date of the ToL): referring to the partial result table
below, one can deduce that in 40% of the member states, defence accounts for
less than 6,72% of total government spending (for collective and individual ben-
efits); half of the states spend an average of 53.020$ per military on active duty.
Interestingly, the threshold to take a state (close to the median on KPI n°12) to
‘the next level’, can also be determined: the amount of dollars spent on equip-
ment per military in active duty would have to increase to 20.890$, if it wanted
to do better than 60% of the other members for this indicator.
11. The percentile of a given value is determined by the percentage of the values that are smaller
than that figure. For example, a test score that is higher than 95 percent of the other scores is in the
95th percentile. 
DEFENCE & SECURITY 
    KEY  PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS 
Remarks 
 (applying to annex A) 
Efficiency  Efficacy 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES        
 1  Deployable Forces as % of Land Forces strength  Target = 40% or as agreed      x 
 2  Sustainable Forces as % of Land Forces strength  Target = 8% or as agreed      x 
 3  Committed troops in any OPS as % of MIL in 
active duty 
In the framework of a SecO, 
not for national ops (e.g. Iraq) 
 4  Operations & Maintenance Expenditures per MIL   in K$, current prices 2006      x 
            
OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT        
 5  Deployable MIL as % of Active Population Act  Population  age 18-49    x   
 6  Committed troops as % of Active Population  idem    x   
 7  RISK SHARE per MIL in operation  (1)      x 
 8  Operations & Maintenance Expenditure per capita  in K$, current prices 2006    x   
            
DEFENCE INVESTMENT        
 9  Defence Expenditure as % of GNI  Purchasing Power Parity (2)    x   
 10  Defence Expenditure as % of Individual & 
Collective Government Spending 
in $, current prices 2005    x   
 11  Personnel Expenditures per MIL  Purchasing Power Parity (2)      x 
 12  Equip/Infra Expenditures per MIL  in K$, current prices 2006      x 
            
(1) Personnel deployment ‘risk premium’ expressed in real or virtual $ per manday deployment, taking into account 
risk factors associated to deployment area (e.g. Afghanistan RC(S) carries higher risk factor than RC(N)) 
(2) Prices are equalised by applying 1/2 of Purchasing Power Parity correction factor  
(PPP correction factors take into account differences in the relative prices of goods and services) 
xBALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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An indicative table of results based on open sources such as EDA reports,12 the
World Bank,13 SIPRI14 and NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Division15 is
shown in Annex A (which the scope of this paper does not allow to provide full
detail on).
An indexed list of defence efforts can then be made based on the average rank-
ings of the states member of a particular organisation, either the EU or NATO.
But the method perfectly allows to index the ranking across both organisations
toward a chosen reference (e.g. Belgium) and present the results graphically.
12. European defence Agency, 2006 National Breakdowns of European Defence Expenditure,
http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx. 
13. World Bank, 2005 International Comparison Program, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS. 
14. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Projects on Military Expenditure and Arms
Production, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/. 
15. NATO IS, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and
Economic Data Relating to Defence, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p 050609e.htm. 
Indicator serial  >>> 
(See 1
st column above)        10        11       12 
Percentile   40% > x  6,72%  32,16 K$  10,94 K$ 
Median       50% > x  7,40%  53,02 K$  12,83 K$ 
Best            60% > x   8,05%  81,36 K$  20,89 K$ 13
4. Concrete Criteria for Participation in 
PermStrucCoop
Analysis of the table in Annex A subsequently informs the translation of defence
indicators of member states into commitments: allocating ‘improvement targets’
becomes a matter of designating those that can be ‘brought to the next level’ (i.e.
reach the threshold for the next higher percentile level) in a particular time-
frame. The strength (but at the same time the political problem) of this approach
is that the effort can be ‘quantified’, most often in budgetary terms or troop
levels.
Referring back to the table of the previous paragraph, it is apparent that 0,68%
(7,40% minus 6,72%) more government spending should be allocated to
defence if a member state wanted to reach the median for this indicator (i.e. to
spend as much as 50% of its peers). Equally, adding 1.890$ (12.830 minus
10940$) to its equipment expenditure per soldier would bring it in the middle
of the group.
Reading across the results table (Annex A) for Belgium e.g., reveals percentiles
below 30 (colour-coded in solid red) for defence expenditure as percentage of
government spending (on individual and collective requirements) as well as
GDP. Risk share and equipment expenditure per military will also qualify as
areas for most needed improvement. A second level of effort (percentile 40, col-
our-coded in orange) would need to target operations with potential gains in the
areas of O&M expenditures and number of troops committed.
Quick reference to the colour-codes on the balanced scorecard shows other
revealing indicators: this last criterion (number of troops committed) is the only
one lagging for Norway, while the first one (defence expenditure as percentage
of government spending) is the only ‘green’ one for Bulgaria.
Some indicators would seem rather ‘volatile’ (e.g. ‘troops committed’ typically
has to be seen over longer periods of time, since it can change with surges or
withdrawals of contingents), others take time to affect (e.g. deployability is tied
to transformation, a complex process stretched over time). Overall though, it
Indicator      >>> 
(See 1
st column table Par 3) 
  Defence Expenditure as % of    
 Individual  &  Collective 
 Government  Spending 
 Equip/Infra 
 Expenditures per 
 MIL 
Median       50% > x   7,40%   12,83  K$ 
Percentile   40% > x   6,72%   10,94  K$ 
Delta   0,68%      1,89 K$ BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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seems obvious that traction for most key performance indicators will have to be
gained through the allocation of more government funding to defence and secu-
rity efforts.15
5. The Other Problem: Force Generation
The founding fathers of PermStrucCoop also had another recurring problem in
mind when they asked candidate Member States to undertake, from the date of
entry into force of the ToL, to “proceed more intensively to develop [their]
defence capacities through the development of national contributions and par-
ticipation, where appropriate, in multinational forces”. Battlegroups could be
commissioned at short notice,16 in particular in response to requests from the
UN, with their support elements including transport and logistics. These combat
formations should be capable of carrying out tasks outside the Union for peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security17 as well as
joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice
and assistance, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, peace-making and
post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks18 may contribute to the fight against
terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in
their territories.
Lacunae in force generation are obviously not new nor confined to the EU, since
NATO and the UN are faced with the same recurring problem: under-resourced
operations. Persistent shortfalls in filling the various Combined Joint Statements
of Requirements (CJSORs) increase the strategic risk to operations as the
Supreme Allied Commander for Operations (SACEUR) recently noted, arguing
that NATO’s most significant shortfall may simply be a lack of national will.
The challenge therefore is to ensure the fulfilment of the Minimum Military
Requirement (MMR) for the execution of an OPLAN and/or the sustainment of
an ongoing operation. The negative impact of typical shortfalls such as the
number of Operational Mentoring & Liaison Teams (OMLT) for Afghanistan
on the likely duration of the operation and the success of our exit strategy
should be brought more prominently to the attention of the political and public
opinions: each fielded OMLT subsequently brings an Afghan Army Battalion on
line, thus relieving an ISAF unit.
16. Within a period of five to 30 days and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days
and be extended up to at least 120 days.
17. Art. 42 of the consolidated EU treaty. 
18. Tasks added in Art. 43 of the consolidated EU treaty, captured as “the most demanding mis-
sions”. 17
6. Military Statements of Requirements: 
Corollary of Political Decisions 
(or Lack Thereof)
Stating that NATO should not commence an operation if it is not resourced
from the outset, CHODs have asked to improve the alignment between the
political decision-making process and assured force generation. Political author-
ities do require sound military advice19 on the implications of each task they
proffer. This advice should – to the extent possible– be expressed in required
capabilities and associated cost,20 not in vague promises of troop commitments.
Conversely, in some cases, a revision of the CJSOR can be the result of non-
decisions: failure to reach consensus on the roles of UNMIK and EULEX in
Kosovo could put KFOR de facto in the position of becoming the first responder
for tasks, which would undoubtedly require more troops or increase the risk of
losing control of the situation.
A revised approach to burden-sharing, more oriented to the support of long-
term expeditionary operations is widely seen as part of the necessary effort.
Through the ‘periodic mission review’, CJSORs should also be more closely kept
in tune with the changing needs and circumstances of the theatre to avoid mis-
sion creep (i.e. changed missions without changed means). Another example
where this mechanism is crucial would occur if the current mandate of ISAF
were to be amended, for instance to include counter-narcotics or counter-terror-
ism as key military tasks.
Both in the EU and NATO, the crux of SOR-fulfilment problems has a name:
‘costs lie where they fall’, financial controller speak to indicate that nations have
to finance their own expenses when committing troops, air or maritime assets
to an operation. The system is different for UN-sponsored troop contributions:
they are indeed – sponsored, an important nuance which will be further elabo-
rated upon.
For the start up of an operation and the commitment of NATO-owned assets
(e.g. AWACS, theatre-wide capabilities,21 initial transport towards the theatre
etc.) a system of common funding has been approved by nations, albeit reluc-
tantly. The reason is that most defence establishments see all budget-posts des-
19. This is the main role and responsibility of the Military Committee, both in NATO and the EU.
20. Hence, the need for instruments to translate military requirements in cost (see further).
21. Such as Communication and Information Systems for Command & Control for the NATO
Response Force.BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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ignated as ‘eligible for common funding’ as competition to their national trans-
formation efforts: bluntly said, it’s money they won’t be able to spend at home...
A comparable system in the EU is ‘ATHENA-funding’, a mechanism deliber-
ately kept separate from common Union spending. It is important to note that
under the consolidated treaty, provisions have been added to ‘facilitate’ the
start-up of an operation by providing an opt-out for funding22 and an exception
to the consensus rule, normally applicable for defence matters: preparatory
activities for missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention
and strengthening international security, which are not charged to the Union
budget, shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States’ contri-
butions.
The special PermStrucCoop protocol adds another incentive to force generation
by privileging the notion of ‘pooling’ and ‘specialisation’, albeit in a somewhat
ambiguous way: some will interpret it as a rationale to cut forces that are per-
ceived as redundant in national inventories. Without this redundancy however,
sustainability of operations – which political or societal evolutions23 have pro-
tracted – would be even more compromised. If pooling is to be interpreted
strictly from the dictionary,24 then the nations that are willing to pool specialised
units (mostly providing ‘enabling’ capabilities) will continuously be called upon
to field them – to support others; and pay for it from national funds ...
Hence, it seem obvious that specialised, enabling or otherwise supporting
forces need to be either commonly funded or compensated, when they are
pooled for the benefit of third or allied nations. Despite the usual intellectual
and diplomatic lip service, two other issues cloud the practicality of pooling
and specialisation however: interoperability and the (national) will to exchange
classified and/or costly information. Just one example of the latter: several
nations pool Helios satellite capabilities, but as a matter of principle, the
imagery is analysed on a strictly national basis and not automatically pooled.
Examples of national and industrial interests that have overcome the former
are so abundant, that any KPI addressing interoperability would predomi-
nantly be colour-coded in red.
22. Article 41 §2 states: “As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence
implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration
under Article 31(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing
thereof”. 
23. KFOR in the first case, ISAF in the second. 
24. Webster’s Revised Dictionary: “To put together; to contribute to a common fund, on the basis
of a mutual division of profits or losses; to make a common interest of”. BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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Faced with the incapacitating consequences of CJSOR-shortfalls, NATO and
the EU are left with very few options: increase political pressure on capitals (e.g.
Canadian peer-pressure by threatening to withdraw their contributions), seek-
ing partners (e.g. Russian strategic transport for EUFOR Chad, non-NATO
troop contributions for KFOR) or outsourcing the effort (e.g. in-theatre airlift
for ISAF). For previously mentioned reasons though, expanding the scope of
eligibility for common funding meets with very limited appetite from nations.21
7. Developing More Equitable Burden-
Sharing Procedures
Filling CJSOR shortfalls has been problematic for ISAF and KFOR as well as
EUFOR Chad. Because of the high operational tempo and the high costs associ-
ated with a possible activation, filling the 6-month-duty-roster for the NATO
Response Force and EU Battlegroups has also become a problem.(25) Sensing a
threat to the very concept of the NRF, which had just been declared operational,
’s Strategic Commanders (SC) reacted to the problem by proposing the interim
option of graduated Force Generation(26) of the NRF.
To put the recurring problem of CJSOR-shortfalls Revised Funding Policy for
Non-Article 5 NATO-’ was agreed by the nations in the NATO Atlantic Council
in October 2005.(27) The revised policy was established with a view to achieve
a more equitable distribution of the financial cost of key theatre-level enablers
by providing common funding, e.g. for Theatre Capability Statements of Require-
ment (TCSOR), i.e. critical theatre-level enabling capabilities not attributable to
a specific nation (‘pooled’, in other words). They are listed a priori in the
OPLAN and put under the operational or logistic control of the theatre com-
mander. These requirements should be provided by lead nations that take
responsibility for assembling and maintaining the required capability from their
own and other nations’ forces, but with common funding paying for the deploy-
ment, the installation and the running of the provided capability.
As a corollary to an effort to harmonise cost-sharing arrangements, a rather
complex burden-sharing mechanism was also set up to take account of the
‘boots-on-the-ground’ committed by a nation to all NATO operations. Previ-
ously, all nations28 had accepted a convergence mechanism of their cost shares
for common funding toward their prospective GNI29 in 2016. The burden-shar-
ing arrangement was temporarily suspended because of an unfortunate coinci-
dence: the benefit that nations such as Canada, the UK and the Netherlands
25. Spain has incurred considerable cost when the Spain-led Land Component of NRF was
deployed to Pakistan for a Disaster Relief operation in January 2005, http://www.nato.int/SHAPE/
news/2006/01/060129a.htm. 
26. 2007 Chiefs of Transformation Conference, Norfolk,11-13 December 2007, http://tran-
snet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/07COTC/2007COTCBR/11DecAMpar. 
27. See also Resolution 337 on Enhanced Common Funding of NATO Operations, NATO Parlia-
mentary Assembly, http://www.naa.be/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=829.
28. Except the USA that insisted on keeping the cost share it had with NATO at 16.
29. Global National Income (GNI) takes into account all production in the domestic economy (i.e.
GDP) plus the net flows of factor income (such as rents, profits, and labour income) from abroad.
The World Bank Atlas method smoothes exchange rate fluctuations by using a three year moving
average, price-adjusted conversion factor and takes purchasing power parities (PPP) into account.
NATO takes half of this PPP-correction into account.BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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should have obtained through their increased effort in Afghanistan was totally
offset by the ‘automatic’ cost share rise tied to their GNI. In the absence of any
risk-sharing considerations, which would have given more weight to these
‘boots-in-danger’, this unintended consequence was deemed inappropriate,
which triggered an impending review of the mechanism.
Arguably though, none of these mechanisms provided enough incentives for
nations to commit enough troops, both in terms of financial effort and risk. It
can be further contended that seeking yet another political commitment by
Heads of State and Government, be it in EU- or NATO-formats, will not change
much to the systemic impasse. Indeed, ultimately, only individual nations can
determine whether political will, availability of capabilities at the national level,
or competition with other national requirements and priorities stand in the way
of committing capabilities. Undoubtedly, the simple but unavowed rationale is
that they don’t wish to spend money on somebody else’s perceived security inter-
ests. Conversely, if useful enablers of force generation could be provided
through the incentives of the revised policies, it would be disparaging to pre-
sume that the current fill rate of the TCSOR is exclusively the result of the avail-
ability of funding, as this would suggest that nations would only contribute
capabilities and assets if common funding were available. In any event, it is safe
to say that a middle ground needs to be found between ‘costs-lie-where-they-
fall’ and ‘common funding’ schemes, perceived to short-change national trans-
formational efforts.23
8. The Conundrum: “Costs-Lie-Where-
They-Fall” vs. “Commun Funding”
Given the complex and dynamic nature of the force generation process, taking
any of these factors in isolation and contending that the final provision of capa-
bilities should be reduced to the single problem of funding, would be to over-
simplify the issue and fail to recognise the impact of other national constraints.
On the other hand, regularly or systematically allowing conflicting national pri-
orities – financial or other – to take precedence on providing critical capabilities
as a member of NATO, the EU or another organisation is bound to result in a
confronting discussion over solidarity debit and credit.
Another dimension of generating forces resides undoubtedly in true or perceived
competition between organisations. While national political will and sovereign
policy decisions prepared in a transparent manner – sanctioned by legislative
oversight – are beyond reproach, the perception of defaulting on long-term and
persistent commitment to a particular organisation can result in considerable
political tension around burden-sharing.
A possible middle ground could be found by considering each commitment in
troops, air or maritime assets that fulfil criteria such as those defined in Article
2 of the special protocol on PermStrucCoop as a contribution in kind to the
objectives of the organisation. In other words, instead of translating below-aver-
age-burden-sharing (boots-on-the-ground) into a financial penalty, as the mech-
anisms described earlier intended, above-average contributions would be usable
as virtual vouchers when the bills are being parcelled out.
Lest situations would occur in which countries offer ill-equipped troops provid-
ing little capability and even less motivation to an operation, optimising allo-
cated funds would entail:
• that all contributions are well trained and equipped for the mission and have
been evaluated through ‘Force Integration Training’, following a normal
‘stand-down’ period after the previous operational commitment (to avoid
battle-stress or over-commitment);
• that troop contributions meet CJSOR definition (i.e. fulfil a Minimum Mili-
tary Requirement, not a national add-on);30
• equally, that offers for ‘Enabling capabilities’ respond to TCSOR require-
ments;
30. Cfr an unsolicited CAN tank unit in ISAF or BEL Force Protection unit in UNIFILBALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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• that funding arrangements are pre-financed by the Troop Contributing
Nation (TCN) and compensations be taken ‘in kind’ as replacement for
‘common funding contributions’ for a pre-planned amount per manday
(combatant or support personnel), flying hour or sailing day.
Although the mechanism would undoubtedly require careful consideration and
staffing before being accepted by nations, it would present a ‘natural incentive’
to offer troop contributions, which are currently withheld for previously men-
tioned reasons or simply because forces allocated to the NRF or an EU Battle-
group leave associated funds unused, in the event that these ‘stand-by forces’ are
not activated.
Beside the fact that the perception would be avoided of paying twice (once under
‘cost-lie-where-they-fall’ and a second time through CRO or ATHENA ‘com-
mon funding’ mechanisms), nations would also be naturally inclined to invest in
the right capabilities, those that can be ‘leased’ to an organisation for operations
(i.e. deemed ‘usable’ and appropriate against abovementioned criteria).
Incidentally, ‘dry & wet lease’ are the exact terminologies used by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly in the implementation document31 of Resolution 50/222, when it
approved a new “method of reimbursement to troop/police-contributing coun-
tries for the utilization of major equipment of Contingent-Owned Equipment
(COE)”, and for the reimbursement of self-sustainment based on the authorized
contingent strength while participating in peacekeeping missions.
Under these provisions, the UN responsibility is to ensure that the peacekeeping
mission has the personnel and equipment required to fulfil its mandate, that the
troop/police contributors provide personnel, equipment and services as detailed
in the specific MOU, and that the contingents perform according to the estab-
lished standards. The instrumentation it creates for the standardization of reim-
bursement rates on an equitable basis and common standards to be applied to
equipment and services provided, could perfectly be adopted by and adapted to
the EU or NATO. So-called ‘Mission factors’ are also determined: they are
intended to take into account specific conditions prevailing in the area of
responsibility that cause unusual wear and tear, shorter life of equipment,
increase maintenance costs and/or risk of damage and loss to the equipment.
31. Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contin-
gent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions
(COE Manual), United Nations A/C.5/60/26 – General Assembly, 11 January 2006. BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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An evaluation grid is used factoring in 3 specific mission circumstances that
form the basis for increments to the reimbursement rates for major equipment
and self-sustainment (minor equipment and consumables):
• an extreme environmental condition factor
• an intensified operational conditions factor
• a hostile action/forced abandonment factor
This approach is very similar to the system several nations use to allocate ‘risk’
premiums to their troops and could be adapted to factor in a degree of ‘risk-
sharing’ between nations.32
32. It was also used as the basis for the KPI mentioned in serial 7 of the table in §3 and in Annex A. 27
9. Conclusion
If finding and agreeing on key performance indicators for accession (and contin-
ued participation) to PermStrucCoop will be difficult enough, funnelling gov-
ernment spending more efficiently to support them will undoubtedly be the crit-
ical success factor – assuming finance ministers will agree to apply some of the
fiscal recipes used for similar permanent structured cooperation around the euro
to defence needs.
The fact of the matter remains that harmonisation and convergence of European
defence efforts almost inescapably point to more financial investments – unless
one persists with the assertion that efficiency and efficacy gains are to be made
without them, not exactly a vote of confidence in the past generations of Min-
isters and Chiefs of Defence.
If European governments are to accept the idea of enhanced – or permanently
structured– security and defence cooperation and agree to put more money into
it, defence establishments have to come with a candid roadmap on how to spend
it and offer SMART performance indicators: Specific – Measurable – Achievable
– Result-oriented – Time-bound.
The method described in this paper leading to a balanced scorecard can be tai-
lored and improved33 to become a valuable tool to research and refine these
performance indicators – or discriminators – for those member states that join,
stay or leave a group of enhanced or permanently structured cooperators.
The other key to improve defence capabilities is to offer ‘natural incentives’ for
force generation: in the framework of PermStrucCoop or NATO’s new IDPP,
capabilities explicitly designated as shortfalls could be deemed ‘acceptable as
compensation in kind’ when offered against a requirement line of the CJSOR/
TCSOR.
Since there is a direct link between political decisions and military requirements,
an instrument to provide resource implications of those decisions (or failure to
reach them) should be at hand. The UN procedures on Troop/Police Contribu-
tors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions provide such a tool and can be easily
adapted to EU and/or NATO needs. Rather than governing a system of reim-
bursements – the current practice in the UN – these contributions in kind could
33. E.g. metrics would need to be designed, agreed and operationalized to reflect collaborative pro-
curement, interoperability, multi-nationality of operational commitments, recognising that the
most controversial and difficult KPI to measure remains ‘capability’. BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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be considered as a ‘credit’ to the account of nations against the Military Budget
(NATO) or ATHENA-fund (EU). National bills would then be reduced by an
amount estimated to (at least partially) compensate for the incremental costs
incurred by offering troops, aircraft or ships to a NATO- or EU-led operation.
It is interesting to note that ‘contributions of the willing’ are made possible
under under the Treaty of Lisbon, since provisions have been adopted to ‘facil-
itate’ the start-up of an operation by providing an opt-out for funding,34 while
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy can
propose a start-up fund for operations, which can be created with a qualified
majority. While this mechanism should facilitate an initial force generation, it
will also put due emphasis on the political decision to intervene militarily: those
that decide not to provide troops or assets will pay for those who do (or be seen
to default on burden sharing)! Investments in the development of national capa-
bilities, would put member states in a better position to ‘lease’ them to a the EU/
NATO, thus relieving them of other burden-sharing obligations, the win-win
situation we need. Whether these natural incentives for ‘leasing troops to an
organisation’ would also be favourable towards pooling and specialisation of
forces is left to the readers for reflection.
34. Cfr. the unilateral declaration of Spain on its refusal to contribute to any funding for new tasks
for KFOR after the declaration of independence of Kosovo, thus effectively opting-out without
breaking consensus at 26, heretofore uncharted terrain for NATO.BALANCING DEFENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A PERMANENTLY STRUCTURED SCORECARD
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